In the U.S., macroeconomic policy makers are concerned about how consumers will respond to falling incomes, nominal home prices, falling income, rising mortgage interest rates and tightening credit standards. In order to address these questions, we estimate and simulate a dynamic structural model of housing demand. In the model, consumers maximize expected discounted lifetime utility from housing services and a composite consumption good. The model allows for realistic features of the housing market including non-convex adjustment costs from buying and selling a home and credit constraints from minimum downpayment requirements.
Introduction
In this paper, we estimate and simulate a dynamic structural model of consumer demand for housing. We use this model to study how housing and non-housing demand will respond to a collapse in home prices, decrease in incomes, increases in interest rates, and a tightening of credit standards. In the early part of the recession housing was at the center of a number of important policy and macroeconomic questions, and still remains an important part of the dialogue during the recovery. Apart from the direct impact on the housing market, our model has quantitative implications for the size of the wealth effect of house price changes on nondurable consumption expenditures. The evidence can thus shed light on whether the recent decline in home prices triggered a drop in aggregate consumption demand and hence sparked the subsequent recession. Looking forward, it can provides guidance on the possible consequences over a longer time horizon.
Over the past decade, housing has appreciated at a very fast rate compared to historical standards. Between 1997 and 2006, the nationwide Case Shiller home price index has more than doubled from 84 to 190. The rate of appreciation in certain U.S. cities was much faster than the national average. However, home prices have recently fallen and there is little evidence that there will be a sharp recovery. Between the peak in 2006 Q2 and 2009 Q2 the nationwide index fell 30%. For the most hard hit cities, such as Miami, Detroit, San Diego, Las Vegas, and Phoenix, prices have fallen between 45% and 55% as of June 2009. In addition, due to the sharp decline in economic activity and a subsequent increase in the unemployment rate household incomes have been falling significantly.
The past two decades have also seen substantial changes in mortgage markets. The traditional 30 year fixed rate mortgage was no longer the standard mortgage product. Since their introduction in the early 1980's the adjustable rate mortgage, had grown to a recent peak of a 40% share of mortgage applications in 2005.
1 In addition to adjustable rate mortgages, there has been an expansion of the subprime mortgage market and other non-conforming loans.
These credit market innovations helped people with low credit quality become homeowners and also allowed households to buy larger homes. However, it is now clear that the expansion of subprime credit also had a downside. Approximately 15% of subprime loans are in default as of August 2009, three times the rate in 2005. 2 As a result, non-conforming mortgages have been more difficult to obtain as lenders have tightened credit in the mortgage market. 3 At the beginning of the downturn policy makers were concerned that higher interest rates (particularly for adjustable rate mortgages) coupled with home price declines and a credit crunch in mortgage markets would put the economy into a recession. Despite the recent reprieve in interest rates, there is still concern going forward that interest rates will creep higher again and that the housing market will stall an economic recovery.
In our structural model, a household solves a life cycle dynamic programming problem. In each period, households make investment decisions in housing, choose non-housing consumption levels, and make decisions regarding mortgage borrowing and savings. Unlike a typical investment vehicle, housing provides a flow of services that enters utility along with non-housing consumption. We include additional realistic features in the model. Adjusting the stock of housing requires the consumer to incur transaction costs meant to capture realtor fees and other costs related to buying and selling a home. This gives rise to a lumpy pattern in housing investment. The model includes credit constraints in the form of minimum down payment requirements for mortgages. We also include bequest incentives by allowing end of life cycle wealth to enter into life time utility. We adopt a partial equilibrium approach by modeling the evolution of income and home prices as exogenous first order Markov processes.
We estimate the structural parameters of our model using household level data on income and housing tenure decisions from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Estimating a fully dynamic model of housing demand is technically challenging; solving the household's dynamic programming problem is computationally difficult because of two key types of nonconvexities. First, housing demand has discontinuities arising from transaction costs to adjust housing stocks. Second, households may face credit constraints because conforming mortgages typically require a 20% down payment. As a result, it is not possible to characterize optimal decisions using Euler equations, nor are we able to use standard GMM methods to estimate the structural parameters.
Instead, we use the multistep method proposed by Bajari, Benkard, Levin (2007) (hereafter BBL) to estimate the model. The first step of BBL requires us to estimate housing decisions rules and the law of motion for the state variables. We use a multinomial logit model of housing investment decisions in the spirit of Han (2008) . In each period households either upgrade to a larger home, downgrade, or remain in their existing home. This reduced form model provides a flexible way to capture lumpy patterns in housing investment. We estimate the evolution the exogenous state variables using standard time series and panel econometric techniques. In the second step, we estimate the structural parameters in household utility. The estimator proposed by BBL solves a revealed preference problem. We assume that the policy function estimated for housing investment in the first stage is the solution to a household's dynamic programming problem. The estimator reverse engineers a period utility function that rationalizes the estimated decision rules by solving a system of revealed preference inequalities.
An attractive feature of our estimator is that it allows for non-convex adjustment costs and credit constraints.
Given our parameter estimates, we use our dynamic model to simulate the response of a household to a set of negative shocks meant to mimic the current disruptions in the U.S. housing market. We use two complementary methods: a reduced form approach and a structural approach. The counterfactuals we consider are a housing price bust and a decrease in income and a tightening of lending standards. Our structural simulation results demonstrate that many households do not alter their housing choice in response to these shocks, but rather adjust nondurable consumption expenditures. The intuition behind this result is simple-households in the model only move two to three times before retirement (as do most households in the data). Because they are locked in, changes in housing market conditions do not influence their consumption, and declines in income are borne by an adjustment of expenditures on nondurable consumption good.
The paper is organized as follows. We review the theoretical and empirical literature relevant for our study in the next section. Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 presents the data and descriptive evidence. In section 5, we provide an overview of the BBL estimation technique.
Section 6 and 7 describe the first and second stage of estimation. In section 8 we present our benchmark model simulation results and section 9 conducts sensitivity analysis with respect to crucial structural parameters. Section 10 concludes; additional details about computation are relegated to the appendix.
Related Literature
Following Mankiw's (1982) seminal aggregate study of consumer durables, a sizeable literature has developed that uses structural household-level models of housing demand and tenure choice to study the interaction between house prices, household consumption, and tenure decisions.
The closest paper in spirit to ours is the work by Li and Yao (2007) , who construct a life cycle model of housing tenure choice to study the impact of house price changes on housing choices and consumer welfare for different age groups of the population. The key distinction between their paper and ours is two-fold. First, while their paper contains a more explicit model of the life cycle and housing tenure choice, they restrict attention to a preference specification in which the elasticity of substitution between nondurables and housing services is fixed to one (that is, the aggregator is of Cobb-Douglas form). Our paper, on the other hand, uses novel empirical techniques to estimate this crucial parameter and finds the elasticity to be larger than one. Our model simulations document that this difference has important implications for the dynamics of household (housing) consumption choices. 4 Second, while their main focus lies on the impact of house price changes on consumption allocations over the life cycle and the distribution of its welfare impacts across different households, we focus more directly on the impact of house price shocks on housing demand and the demand for nondurable consumption. estimates of the wealth effects from other financial assets. Our focus is on the negative wealth effect from home price declines as well as the interaction with down payment constraints and negative income shocks.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on estimation of dynamic decision problems with non-convex adjustment costs. To the best of our knowledge, the only paper that attempts to estimate such a structural model is Hall and Rust (2003) . The simulated minimum distance estimator that they propose is not computationally feasible in our application because it requires repeatedly computing the optimal policy function. Computing a single optimal policy function in our model takes one week of CPU time with an advanced workstation. Our estimator avoids the burden of repeatedly computing optimal policies. Finally, our paper is closely related to Han (2008) . Our first stage is quite similar to her reduced form model of housing demand. We depart from her work because we estimate a households structural utility parameters. This allows us to explore counterfactuals that would not otherwise be possible in a reduced form approach.
The Model
We model a typical households' consumption and housing choice as a partial equilibrium, dynamic decision problem with a finite lifetime horizon. Households live for T periods and in each period t choose consumption expenditures on nondurables, c t ,and the amount of one period-risk free financial assets to bring to the next period, a t+1 . We let h t denote the size of the household's real housing stock at the beginning of the period so that h t+1 is the amount of housing chosen today for tomorrow. A household derives a service flow g(h t ) = gh t from the housing stock where g > 0 is a parameter. In our applications we shall assume that g = 0.075. Households value nondurable consumption and housing services according to a standard intertemportal lifetime utility function
where β is the standard time discount factor and the parameter γ measures the degree of altruism that motivates households to leave bequests b T at the end of life. Expectations E 0 are taken with respect to the stochastic processes driving labor income and house prices, to be specified now. Let p t denote the relative price of one unit of housing, in terms of the numeraire nondurable consumption good. Housing prices {p t } T t=0 follow first order stochastic Markov processes.
At time 0, agents are endowed with initial asset holdings (a 0 , h 0 ) and one unit of time per period, which they supply inelastically to the labor market to earn labor income y t . The labor income process is composed of two components, a deterministic mean life cycle profile ε t (which incorporates aggregate income growth in the economy as a result of technological progress) and a stochastic component η t that follows a first order Markov process. Households retire at an exogenous age T r and receive a flat pension benefit b until they die. Thus labor income is given by
We model the two main frictions in the housing market explicitly. First, the stock of housing is subject to nonconvex adjustment costs. Specifically, in order to purchase a home of size h t+1 the household has to spend
where p t h t+1 is the purchase price of the home and p t φ(h t+1 , h t ) is the transaction cost a household has to bear when adjusting the owned stock housing from h t to h t+1 . We assume that the function φ takes the form
where the number φ measures the percent of the value of the house that both a seller and a buy has to bear as transaction cost. In most of our analysis we shall assume that φ = 0.03., that is, which is representative of real estate fees.
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The second key friction in the housing market we model explicitly is the requirement for households to acquire (and maintain) some minimal positive equity share in the house. We assume that the joint choice of financial assets and housing positions satisfies the following 5 We do not have direct data on transaction prices. In principle, we could infer them indirectly through the use of our structural model. However, taking a direct stance on transaction costs will give a more efficient estimate of the remaining model parameters. As we shall show in our policy simulations, our model is able to reasonably match the observed moving frequencies in our data, where transaction costs play a large role. Also, the simulation results suggest that qualitatively, many of our policy conclusions will be robust to a fairly broad range of transaction costs as long as they are sizeable (and as long as the adjustment cost function has the nonconvex form we have specified).
collateral constraint:
Here ξ ∈ [0, 1] is the fraction of the purchase price of the house that has to be paid down at purchase, i.e. (1 − ξ) is the fraction of the purchase price that can be financed via a mortgage.
In most of our experiments we shall assume that households are able to finance at most 80 percent of their housing purchases through mortgages. 6 Also note that as long as ξ ∈ [0, 1] households can only borrow against their housing collateral; uncollateralized debt is therefore ruled out by assumption in our model.
Thus the key frictions in the housing market are summarized by the transaction cost φ parameter and the collateral constraint parameter ξ, with φ = ξ = 0 denoting frictionless housing markets. Our simulation exercises will therefore be able to quantify the importance of frictions in the housing market by deducing optimal choices of households under various assumptions on (φ, ξ).
In addition to housing households can use financial assets to accumulate wealth. These assets yield a constant real interest rate r. If households borrow (subject to the collateral constraints) they face a real mortgage interest rate r m > r. In most of our exercises we treat interest 
Finally, consumption and housing choices are constrained to be nonnegative:
Households maximize (1) subject to the constraints (2), (3) and (4) . In the appendix we offer further details on the recursive formulation and computation of this partial equilibrium household decision problem.
Data and Descriptive Evidence
In this section, we discuss our data which primarily comes from the Home equity averages $59,000, whereas non-housing wealth reported in the CEX averages $12,000. Most households, 77%, finance their home using a mortgage and carry a positive mortgage balance. Annual mortgage payments account for 9% of total income on average.
Aggregate Descriptive Evidence
Adjustment costs to moving play a key role in our model. If the costs are high enough, the model predicts households should move to a different home infrequently and make lumpy adjustments to housing stock. This behavior is evident in the data. Households move in just 4.3% of the years. The size of the adjustments are large, averaging a change of $40,000 in 7 We only include households where the head of household is married, between the age of 20 and 65 and born between 1920 and 1959. We exclude households where the head of household changed during the sample period and any household that reports an income below $10,000 or above $150,000, a trimming of approximately the top and bottom 2% of households based on income. We also exclude a small number of households reporting negative home equity balances. 8 Formerly the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) average increase in home size of $24,000. Table 2 lists frequencies for the number of moves per household during the 14 year sample period. The majority of households, 58%, never move, and it is rare for a household to move more than once. Extrapolated over a life-cycle, households move one or two times after their first home purchase. Consistent with lumpy investment behavior, the large standard deviation in the ratio of house value to income (1.54 reported in Table 3 reports summary statistics by birth cohort. Several patterns emerge about life cycle behavior. 9 Both income and housing exhibit a hump-shaped pattern. Young households move into progressively larger homes until they are middle aged and in the process accumulate home equity, both in total and as a percentage of home value. But as households approach retirement, income falls and they downgrade to smaller homes. The frequency of moves declines in age, from 6.3% for the youngest cohort to 2.7% for the oldest. 
Life Cycle Patterns

Estimation Procedure
We use the two-step method proposed by Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007) for estimating stochastic dynamic models. It is a burgeoning technique that is finding applications in many settings, such as the estimation of dynamic oligopoly models (Ryan (2006) , Sweeting (2007) , Snider (2008) ). It can also be applied to dynamic single agent choice problems, and is a particularly attractive method for estimating rich models like our application. It can accommodate continuous controls and non-convexities such as adjustment costs and credit constraints. More importantly, the method is computationally feasible. In our simulation exercises it takes up to one week of CPU time to solve our model. Therefore, a nested fixed point algorithm which requires repeatedly calculating the full solution to the model will not be computationally possible.
The estimator is based on the principle of revealed preferences and is quite intuitive in its application. Consider a simple static setting to understand the intuition. The estimator compares utility from observed actions in the data to alternative, non-optimal actions and selects utility function parameters that best rationalize the observed choices. It only requires that the data are generated by rational agents maximizing utility. In a dynamic setting the estimator compares discounted expected utility from estimated optimal policy functions to suboptimal policy functions. Making this comparison requires an additional step of forward simulating actions to estimate expected discounted utility. We first outline this step in the context of our application and proceed to formally describe the revealed preference estimation approach.
In the model in section 3 the exogenous state variables s = {y, p, r}: income, home prices, and interest rates follow a first order Markov process.
where in recursive form s is next periods value of the state variables.
A household's policy function,σ(·), inherits the Markov property;
where a and h denote endogenous state variables: household debt and housing stock. Using standard techniques in cross sectional and time series econometrics we form estimates π and σ of the Markov process for exogenous state variables and policy functions.
In the first stage we use forward simulation to estimate discounted expected utility. Consider household i at time t with current state variable s i,t . We simulate a pseudo-random sequence of the state variable and housing and savings decisions for time period τ = t, t + 1, t + 2, ...., T using the following algorithm:
3. If τ < T − 1, return to 1.
We draw r = 1, ..., R pseudo-random sequences in this manner. Denote a generic sequence as
We interpretÊ[U ; θ,σ, π, s it ] as an estimate of agent i's expected discounted utility at time t when the state is s i,t . Note thatÊ[U ; θ,σ, π, s it ] holds fixed the Markov process π, the (estimated) optimal policyσ, and the parameters of the utility function θ.
Let σ a =σ denote a policy function other than the estimated policyσ. We can simulate the expected discounted utility from σ a as:
where
is draw analogously to step 1-3 above replacingσ with σ a .
We perform these forward simulations for all N household-year observations and A alternative policy functions. We define our estimator as:
If the household is rational, it must be the case that at the true utility parameter value θ 0
That is, the true policy yields higher utility than any alternative policy. Suppose we have a very large sample of household-year observations N and simulation draws R. Consistency of the first stage estimates guarantees thatσ converges to σ and π to π. The large value of R will then guarantee thatÊ[U ; θ,σ, π, s it ]
converges to E[U ; θ, σ, π, s it ]. This implies that the sample analogue of revealed preference should hold in a limiting sense. That is,
The loss function in the estimator penalizes those observations corresponding to large deviations from utility maximization. In this sense, the estimator selects aθ which rationalizesσ as an optimal choice rule.
Bajari Benkard and Levin (2007) discuss the formal econometric theory and provide regularity conditions for consistency and asymptotic normality. In order to guarantee consistency and asymptotic normality, there are three sources of error to consider. The first is sampling error which makes our first stage policy function and exogenous state variable estimatesσ, π differ from their true value σ, π . The second is simulation error from choosing a finite number of simulations paths R. The third comes from using only a finite number of alternative policies A.
First Stage: Reduced Form Policy Functions
In the presence of transactions cost to moving, households move infrequently and, when they do, make lumpy adjustments to their stock of housing. To capture the discreteness in the timing of moves, we model the moving decision as a discrete choice problem. There are three alternative moving decisions M it : remaining in the existing home, downgrading to a smaller home, and upgrading. We use a multinomial logit model. The probability of household i making a moving choice of j at time t is given by
exp (x it β k ) Two of the primary covariates in x it are income and the size of the current home. We expect households that experience an increase in income to be more likely to upgrade and less likely to downgrade. Households occupying small homes would be more likely to upgrade and less likely to downgrade. To capture the impact of a down payment constraint, we include a linear spline in the home equity ratio. Specifically, we allow the effect of the home equity ratio to differ for equity ratios above and below 15%. If down payment constraints have an important effect on housing decisions we would expect the likelihood of moving-in particular, upgrading-to reduce significantly as equity falls through the lower range. We would expect the equity ratio to have much less effect in the higher home equity range. We apply the user cost method to measure the price of home ownership. It is a widely accepted measure for the cost of durable goods, such as housing. We use a simple measure: the difference in real interest rates and the expected real rate of home price inflation. This measure captures both the financing costs of mortgage interest payments and the offsetting investment component of housing capital gains. In our application, we assume households have rational expectations and thus measure expected home price inflation using the realized value of contemporaneous home price inflation. We also condition on age and age-squared.
We use a parsimonious specification to capture the lumpiness in housing stock adjustments.
We model the size of housing stock adjustments as a simple average of log changes in home size:
Under the assumption that the error term and u error term in the multinomial logit model are uncorrelated, we can estimate the adjustment size separately using the subset of households that either upgrade or downgrade. The error term in the multinomial logit model can be interpreted as capturing unobserved factors such as a job relocation. Such non-financial factors on their own would affect the likelihood of moving, but have no bearing on the adjustment size. Table 4 reports results for the multinomial logit model. The coefficients on the decision to remain in the current home are normalized to zero. Almost all of the coefficient signs are as expected. Households in larger homes are more likely to downgrade and less likely to upgrade.
Reduced Form Policy Function Results
As income increases, they are more likely to upgrade and less likely to downgrade. As the price of housing increases, measured by the user cost, households are less likely to upgrade.
User cost has an insignificant effect on downgrades. We find down payment constraints are quite important. In the low equity range, below 15%, a drop in equity lowers the probability of upgrading. The magnitude is very large. Somewhat surprisingly, they are also less likely to downgrade as equity falls. In fact this makes sense. For any move, even a downgrade, households would have difficulty securing a new mortgage. In the high equity range, home equity has no significant effect on upgrades, but extra equity makes it less likely for a household to downgrade.
Finally, older households are less likely to make any sort of adjustment. 10 We also tested methods that distinguished upward and downward adjustment sizes and parameterized adjustment size through factors such as income and home size. We found that such models performed poorly when simulations veered outside the support of the distribution of the variables. Moreover, with so few observations of upgrades and downgrades there is a large loss in degrees of freedom from estimating separate adjustment sizes. 11 We also experimented with an (S,s) inventory model of durable good expenditures as in Attanasio (2000) and Ryan (2006) . This model imposes more structure than a flexible multinomial logit. With so few adjustments, the (S,s) model did not yield reasonable results. 
Mortgages and Savings
We do not have reliable data on household savings, mortgage choices, and bequests and cannot estimate these decisions from data. Instead we assume households used mortgage products that were common during the 1980's and early 1990's. We also assume housing is only the source of wealth. This is reasonable because our data from the CEX shows non-housing wealth is insignificant portion of households' total assets.
We assume household finance with 30 year fixed rate mortgages. A household that moves transfers home equity from its prior residence into the new home. The remaining value of the home is financed with a new 30 year fixed rate mortgage set at the prevailing interest rate.
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In some instances, particularly near the end of the life cycle, a household could have excess home equity. This happens for downgrades to homes valued less than the current amount of home equity. We lock this excess wealth into an annuity with an amortization term that expires at end of the life cycle. Thus, the annuity is completely drained at the end of life cycle.
Periodic payments supplement income. Consumption is simply the difference between income and mortgage payments. If a household pays off its mortgage in full, it consumes its entire income. Households do not prepay or refinance mortgages, nor can they borrow against their home equity. These assumptions restrict a household's ability to draw down home equity to smooth consumption and to save beyond the value of a home in anticipation of a bequest.
When a household moves, it pays an adjustment cost equal to six percent of the new home's value. This is the industry standard realtor fee. We interpret this cost as a conservative lower bound because there are search costs, relocation expenses, and other non-monetary adjustment costs that we cannot quantify.
We do not directly impose a down payment constraint. Instead, we let down payment constraints enter through the equity ratio term in the multinomial logit model of moving decisions. Finally, it is necessary to impose a subsistence requirement. In rare instances simulated consumption would be negative. We endow those households with $1,000 in consumption. Likewise, if home equity is negative at the end of the life cycle, we endow those households with $1,000 in equity for a bequest. Both of these assumptions can be interpreted as an insurance policy against particularly poor shocks.
We must make these assumptions because we do not have reliable data on mortgage financing and savings. Nonetheless, we feel they are reasonable, and we show that our forward simulations match key moments from the life cycle quite closely. 
Exogenous State Variables: Income, Home Prices and Interest
Rates
The process for income includes an age component, a cohort effect, household random effects, and an AR(1) error disturbance:
Estimates are reported in table 5 which shows that income is persistent and exhibits a hump-shaped pattern over the life-cycle.
We model the time series process for real interest rates i t and real home price inflation π t as a Vector Auto-Regression (VAR) with one lag, Standard errors in parentheses.
where the error term is distributed bivariate normal, e ∼ N (0, Σ). We use a longer time 
Goodness of Fit
To evaluate the fit of our model we compare statistics from our forward simulations to those in the data. Rather than compare broad descriptive statistics, we put our simulations to a more demanding test by showing statistics parsed at various age intervals in the life cycle. In particular, we examine the entire simulated life cycles for the youngest households aged 30 to 34. The fit is remarkable.
In this exercise, we average several key variables across households and simulations path broken down into five year intervals. As a basis for comparison, we duplicate the corresponding statistics from the cohort table (3) and report them alongside the simulation results. See table   7 . As a cautionary note, exact dollar valued figures should not be directly compared because of the cohort growth trends in income and growth in the home price index. There is also a hump shaped pattern in home size; in early years households upgrade rapidly, then there is a leveling off mid-life, and a slight drop at the tail end of the life cycle. This pattern is largely driven by the moving frequencies. In early years, there is a high rate of upgrades which gradually declines to a low level by the end of the life cycle. Downgrading frequencies are very low and constant up until age 55 at which point they start increasing.
Move frequencies match the data quite closely. Although the dollar-valued magnitudes cannot be directly compared, notice that for income and home size the peaks in the hump exactly match the timing in the data. That is, in mid-life (ages 50-54) income peaks, and with a lag (ages 55-59) home size peaks. We also see a steady growth in house values over the life cycle which is partly due to upgrades, and also real home price inflation. In addition, home equity grows as households pay off mortgages and experience home price capital gains. We capture an increase in the home equity ratio (home equity/home value) over the life cycle, but the rate of equity accumulation is slower than in the data. This is in part an artifact of how mortgages are amortized. We assume amortization of mortgages at a fixed real interest rate, whereas most mortgage contracts are amortized based on a fixed nominal rate. Nominal rate mortgages accumulate equity faster in earlier years than real interest rate loans. As a minor point, we include an entry for non-house wealth. This is the size of the annuity from left over home equity for those households that downgrade to homes worth less than their home equity. The magnitude is small, on the order of at most 2% of home equity wealth, and thus the assumptions about non-house savings behavior should have a negligible effect on our final results.
Second Stage
In this section, we describe the second stage of the estimation procedure that estimates the primitive utility function parameters.
Utility Function
We model period utility with a familiar constant elasticity of substitution form. During the life cycle households derive utility from housing, h and non-durable consumption c, according to the period utility function, where θ and τ are utility parameters to be estimated. The term, θ captures consumption shares, and the term τ captures the elasticity of substitution between housing and non-housing consumption. The elasticity parameter is particularly important as our counterfactual exercises will demonstrate in the next section. Other models of housing demand (see Li and Yao (2007) ) assume this parameter takes on a value of zero (unit elasticity). We set the utility flow of housing parameter to κ = 0.075. This value is consistent with the literature on owners equivalent rent.
Households discount period utility at a rate β = 0.97 through age 70.
14 Utility from bequest motives or, depending on interpretation, retirement wealth enters additively. 15 Lifetime utility for a household of age, a = a 0 , is
where q 70 is the amount of home equity at age 70. The log functional form on the bequest/retirement component imposes an Inada condition that home equity should be positive.
The bequest parameter γ is the third parameter to be estimated.
Estimation Details
Estimation of the utility function parameters follows the Bajari, Benkard, Levin (2007) method outlined in section 4. First, we forward simulate life cycles under the optimal policy function that we estimated in the first stage. Next, to apply the revealed preference approach, we forward simulate several alternative life cycle paths that follow perturbed, non optimal policy functions.
There are three types of alternative policy functions. The first type draws uniform random perturbations of the multinomial logit model parameters. For the second type, we manually generate variation in moving frequencies and housing shares. Specifically, households move every Nth year, where, for different alternatives, N varies between 3 and 10. In a moving year, households move to a house of size H, which varies across alternatives in a range between 88% and 112% of a household's initial housing to income ratio. This variation helps to identify housing shares, which depend on both the consumption share θ and elasticity τ parameters. It is difficult to separately identify both of these parameters because of a multiplying-a-parameterby-a-parameter problem. The variation in moving frequencies helps to separately identify the elasticity of substitution. The intuition is that the elasticity determines the length of time that a household would tolerate living in a home that is not optimal. We will show this effect in our counterfactual exercises. For the third type, we allow households to either deplete or add to home equity in the last five years of the life cycle. In each of those five years, they either convert up to 10% of home equity into consumption or add up to 10% to home equity by reducing consumption. Under the optimal policy they neither add to nor reduce home equity.
These alternatives generate variation to identify the retirement/bequest parameter.
Second Stage Results
We estimate the model on a sub-sample of 450 households. We simulate 55 life cycle paths per household. We use 22 alternative policies with 30% manually generating moving frequency and housing share variation, and 30% varying end of life home equity. Despite the computational advantages of the method, this is the largest sample that our workstation can accommodate. We use a subsampling procedure to calculate standards. In particular, we estimate the parameters on 100 separate subsamples of the same size.
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The results are presented in Table 8 . Notice the elasticity of substitution parameter is significantly greater than zero.
As a validation of the results, it is useful to take the estimated parameter results and calculate implied housing shares in a static model of housing demand. 17 The implied housing share of income is 17.31%. These shares compares quite favorably to the 14.3% share in the raw data.
Counterfactual Simulations
In our simulation exercises, we are interested in tracing out households' dynamic responses to a decline in home prices. We carry out the exercises using two methods. In the first, we use our reduced form model from the first stage to simulate counterfactuals. In the second, we use our structural estimates of the utility parameters to explicitly solve the household's dynamic programming problem, and then forward simulate counterfactuals for a typical household. There are important differences between the two methods. The reduced form method traces out averages for the key economic variables (home size, consumption, home equity) for the whole sample population. In contrast, our structural approach focuses on a single life cycle path for just one representative household. This focused analysis allows us to show the lumpiness in a household response, whereas the population averaged reduced form approach shows smooth responses in the aggregate. A further advantage of the structural approach is that we can be less restrictive with our assumptions. In particular, data limitations required us to impose restrictions on savings and mortgage borrowing behavior (no outside savings, no mortgage prepayment, no home equity lines of credit). Without data restrictions, we are able to relax all of these assumptions.
In addition to a home price decline, we consider other calamitous counterfactuals: a drop in income and a rise in interest rates. For the structural approach, we conduct a set of sensitivity exercises that alter the estimated structural parameters and the parameters that we did not explicitly estimate. In our three exercises, we eliminate the 6% adjustment cost, adjust the elasticity of substation parameter, and tighten lending standards by increasing the minimum down payment constraint. These exercises highlight an advantage of the structural approach.
There is no variation in the data that would allow us to test these changes in a reduced form method.
Reduced Form Simulations
In the reduced form counterfactuals, we are particularly interested in comparing "substitution", "income", and "wealth" effects. The terms are italicized because their exact meaning in a dynamic model of housing does not perfectly translate into classical intuition from consumer theory. To fix ideas, consider our first counterfactual of a one time drop in home prices.
Compared to a baseline without the change, home prices will be lower in all subsequent years.
The "substitution" effect prescribes that households would increase their stock of housing when faced with lower prices. If housing is a normal good, the "income" effect would also have households increase their stock of housing. Now, consider the "wealth" effect, which is only a relevant distinction from an income effect in a dynamic model. A home price decline reduces home equity or, in other words, wealth. The expected wealth effect would have households reduce their housing stock. We are also interested in the impact on non-housing consumption.
The substitution effect would have households reduce consumption; the income effect, increase consumption if it is a normal good; the wealth effect, reduce consumption. Overall, the net effect of a home price drop is ambiguous.
One-time Home Price Drop
In this exercise, we subject households to a one time 30% drop in home prices (and for comparison a 30% increase). To present the results, we divide the sample into three groups categorized by home equity ratios (below, 25%, above 25%, and in between). The division also reflects age groups, older households have a larger equity share than younger households. The results for several key economic variables are plotted in figures 1 to 5. Our focus will be on a comparison of the home price decline and the baseline with no change. They are depicted by the red and yellow lines. The green line is for a home price increase.
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First notice, home equity (figure 1). It drops significantly. For the youngest households it falls into negative territory and remains there for many years. Also notice that for all groups the drop persists over a 15 year time period.
Next consider the effect of a price decline on home size or in other words, housing demand (figure 2). For high equity households, there is no effect of a price change on housing demand.
The net substitution, income, and wealth effects all wash away to zero. But for low equity households, housing demand falls significantly. The wealth effect clearly dominates. 19 The intuition is quite clear; down payment constraints bind for low equity households. They are typically at an age of rapid housing accumulation, but they are literally stuck in their homes after losing all of their home equity. The charts of upward and downward adjustments (figures 4, 5) show that moving frequencies drop to near zero. 20 Since any move-whether upgrading or downgrading-would require a new mortgage application we would not expect a down payment constrained household to make any move. Only after at least 10 years of slowly building home equity is there an appreciable uptick in home size.
The impact of a home price decline on consumption is somewhat surprising, but nonetheless intuitive. Consumption increases. See figure 3 . Since no one is upgrading housing, and housing The effect of a home price drop on consumption is one of the most policy relevant topics in this paper. This result calms the fear that a home price decline would have a devastating effect on consumption and hence aggregate demand. To the contrary, we find a home price decline either has negligible effect or could in fact boost consumption. As a qualification to all of these results, we should state that our reduced form model does not allow households to adjust savings behavior. A low equity household might instead increase its savings rate to replenish home equity. In our structural approach, we allow for more flexibility in savings patterns, but nonetheless corroborate our reduced form findings.
Permanent Income Drop
In this counterfactual we expose households to a permanent 25% drop in income. The drop is relative to the normal hump-shaped pattern of life cycle income. The income effect on housing is positive, and in this sense housing is a normal good. In response to an income decline, households upgrade less frequently and downgrade more frequently. The net result is that they live in smaller homes. See figures 6, 7, 8. Despite a discernible change in home size, the dollar value of home equity is virtually unaffected by income changes. But, the home equity ratio 
Permanent Interest Rate Increase
In the final set of counterfactuals, we change interest rates: both an increase from the sample average of 7.24% to 13.24, and a decrease to 1.24%. Interest rate changes are reflected in the user cost term. The results are straightforward. In response to an interest rate increase, home size decreases as upward adjustments decrease and downward adjustments increase. See figures 12, 13, 14. Apart from home prices, interests rates measure the cost of housing. Measured this way, consumption's cross price elasticity is negative; consumption decreases when interest rates on housing rise. The income effect dominates the substitution effect. Despite the tendency 9 Simulation Results from the Structural Model
Parameterization
In the interest of clarity we briefly summarize the parameters used for the simulations of the structural model. Whenever possible and applicable we use the parameters estimated and employed in the previous sections.
We now use these parameters to simulate the response of consumption and asset accumulation choices of households to income and house price shocks. We proceed in three steps. First, in order to briefly explain the main mechanisms of the structural model we display the life cycle profiles in the absence of shocks. Then we subject households to joint income and house price shocks, under the benchmark parameterization. Finally we assess the importance of the size of financial constraints, interest rates and the elasticity of substitution between consumption and housing services in the utility function for our results. The first two sensitivity analyses are mo- The third exercise aims at displaying that precise estimates of structural utility parameters are quantitatively important in assessing the model-implied consumption and wealth response to income and house price shocks. Figure 17 displays life cycle profiles of income shocks 21 η t and house prices p t (the exogenous stochastic driving forces of the model), consumption of the composite good c t , financial assets a t+1 , real housing assets h t+1 and a variable we call voluntary equity q t+1 = a t+1 + (1 − ξ)p t h t+1 .
The Mechanics of the Model
As explained in the appendix, it is helpful computationally to use this variable instead of financial wealth in the recursive formulation of the household problem. However, introducing this variable is not only useful for computation, but also helps to interpret the simulation results. Note from the financing constraint (2) put. The fact that households move several times prior to reaching their unconstrained optimal size of the house is due to the presence of the financing constraint. As can be seen from the time path of voluntary equity, after the first move the household's financing constraint is binding and voluntary equity is zero, q t = 0. After three periods households start to accumulate equity 21 Recall that total labor income is given by y t = η t ε t . Thus what we plot here is income net of the deterministic life cycle component which yields profiles that are easiert to interpret in the presence of income shocks. 22 We cannot start households off with zero housing since housing purchased today only generates services tomorrow and the utility function is not well-defined at h = 0. Instead we let h 0 = h min , where h min is the smallest point on the housing grid. 23 Qualitatively it makes no difference for the dynamics of consumption and housing choices whether the constant prices and incomes are equal to the low or the high realization of the corresponding Markov chains although quantitatively low house prices and high incomes generate slighly larger and more rapid adjustmens in the housing stock position. This last adjustment is "unconstrained" in the sense that the financing constraint is not binding at this move: the households could have afforded a larger home but finds it suboptimal to choose such a larger housing position. In contrast to previous moves the equity stake of the household in her home exceeds the required minimum share as q t falls following the move but remains positive.
Absent the financing constraint (but in the presence of the nonconvex adjustment cost) households would have moved only once, in the absence of shocks, catapulting them to the optimal size of the house right away. Thus in order to reproduce the stylized fact documented above that households adjust the size of their home infrequently, but more than once on average over their lifetime, the combination of both frictions in the housing market is crucial.
Quantitatively the model reproduces the average time in between housing adjustments and the number of moves during a households' lifetime documented above for US data rather well, at least for the early part of the life cycle. 24 To the extent that the model abstracts from housing transaction triggered by relocation shocks we would expect the model to understate the frequency with which households move. This is apparent for households in Having discussed how households behave in the absence of income and house price shocks we are now prepared to document to explain how these households, within the model, respond to a simultaneous decline in incomes and house prices as observed recently for the US economy.
Simulating an Income and House Price Shock
The exercise we carry out is intended to mimic a sudden, unlikely, but not entirely inconceivable (from the households' perspective) decline in the housing price. At the same time the household receives a negative income shock (which by construction is highly, but not perfectly persistent). 25 Given the stylized nature of our structural model which is necessitated by our desire to estimate it and provide a tight link between theory and estimation we view our precise quantitative results as less important than to exhibit to what extent model elements and parameters (e.g. adjustment costs, the size of the down payment constraint) affect the size of this number.
In figure 18 we display the life cycle patterns of consumption, housing and financial wealth prior and following a negative income shock. We add a concurrent negative house price shock the later stages in their life cycle where the model, absent income and house price shocks, predicts no housing size adjustments at all. 25 Of course, since we use the decision rule of households derived under the Markov process for income and prices, households at any period understand that the state of the Markov process can switch with certain probabilty. We merely trace out the dynamic response of households to a particular realization of the stochastic process. The key observations we make from both figures is that
• In response to a negative income shock households adjust nondurable consumption, but do not size down their homes. When the negative income shock hits households are in the process to move up in the housing ladder and find it suboptimal to (temporarily) downsize.
• The income shock does affect the life cycle profile of housing and nondurable consumption significantly. Relative to the benchmark scenario where households reach their desired stock of housing at age 34, with persistently low income moving up in the housing ladder is delayed by a good 16 years (note that this assumes that income falls permanently) 26 .
The low income realizations slow down the accumulation of housing equity and thus delay the purchase of a larger house.
• While the optimal level and general life cycle profile of housing position is not affected by the fall in housing prices, the timing of the housing adjustments following the shocks 26 Of course, given that income and house prices are driven by mean-reverting Markov chains, households perceive a positive probability that prices and income will recover.
is. Specifically, because houses are cheaper now households adjust to their optimal level more quickly, by about 5 years.
• The age/equity position at the time when the shock happens is important in determining the household consumption and saving response. If we subject a middle aged household (of age 35 or older) with significant equity in her house to the same shocks, this household finds it optimal to keep her entire life cycle profile of housing unaltered and absorb the entire shocks by adjusting nondurable consumption. A household of this age has accumulated sufficiently many assets (relative to the loss in income over the remaining working life) to keep nondurable consumption reasonably smooth despite the unfavorable income realizations. This result confirms our empirical results that showed that the age and housing equity are important determinants of housing choices.
• As our results without nonconvex adjustment costs below indicate, the sluggish adjustment of the housing position to shocks crucially depends on the imposition of sizeable transaction costs for adjusting the size of houses.
Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we perform sensitivity analysis with respect to three parameters. The first set of comparative statics results is motivated by recent policy relevant changes in the US mortgage market. In particular we want to deduce the impact, within our model, of a tightening of credit lines, as observed in the current crisis of the US mortgage market.
Second we demonstrate that the model with nonconvex adjustment costs on housing gives fundamentally different predictions about household responses to income and house price changes than the frictionless benchmark model of consumer durables (as put forward by Mankiw (1982) ) in which the adjustment of the stock of housing is completely costless.
Finally, we have spent considerable effort in precisely estimating the preference parameters of our model, in particular the elasticity of substitution between nondurable consumption and housing services in the utility function. We therefore want to investigate to what extent the results of our model depend on this parameter. To this extent we repeat our simulations with a Cobb-Douglas utility specification which is commonly employed in macroeconomics (see e.g. 
Relaxing the Financing Constraint
Our model is rich enough to address the question, albeit in stylized form, of what happens to households housing and nondurable consumption decisions as the financial sector tightens credit lines for mortgages. We now draw out the household response to a simultaneous decline of income and house prices under the assumption that households are required to hold only a ξ = 10% equity share of the value of their home as opposed to ξ = 20% as modelled so far.
Comparing figure 20 to our benchmark results in figure 17 we observe that the main consequence of a relaxed downpayment constraint is that households purchase larger homes early in life, and tend to move less frequently. This finding is due to the fact that a relaxed constraint allows households to more quickly trade up in the housing ladder since they can finance more of the purchase price of the house at young ages where they are severely constrained by the collateral constraint. The response to income and price shocks does not depend strongly on the value of ξ, since at the time adjustment after the shock is optimal the financing constraint was not binding anymore even with the tighter financing constraint ξ = 20%, see figure 19.
The Role of Adjustment Costs
The second key friction in the housing market that we model, besides the downpayment constraint, is the presence of sizable transaction costs that need to be borne if (and only if) households change the size of their home. The benchmark model of consumer durables in (see e.g. Mankiw (1982) ). Our model nests this specification; by setting the adjustment cost parameter φ = 0 we obtain the the frictionless model. 27 In figure 21 we show, in the absence of income shocks, that this model delivers fundamentally different predictions for the life cycle profiles of consumption, housing and financial assets.
Without adjustment costs the model loses its implications derived from the Ss type decision rules for the housing stock. Now the build-up of consumer durables in the early stages of a household's live proceeds more gradually. 28 Note that consumption increases over time since, as long as the household is in debt the relevant interest rate households face is the mortgage interest rate r m and β(1 + r m ) > 1.
The model without nonconvex adjustment costs also differs substantially from our benchmark in the way households respond to income and house price shocks. See figure 22 . Now the stock of housing reacts immediately and significantly to the persistent income decline.
Nondurable consumption responds as well.
29 27 Mankiw's model of a representative consumer did not explicitly include downpayment constraints nor did it calibrate the household income process to micro data. 28 We solve this version of the model with the same discrete state space dynamic programming techniques as the benchmark in order to allow for the results to be as comparable as possible. 29 Note that the financing constraint remains present in this version of the model. When the shock hits this constraint is binding and thus a decline in the real value of houses leads to a decline in the value of collateral. Households can borrow less, and consumption of nondurables falls significantly. 
The Role of the Elasticity of Substitution
Finally we show that the dynamic consumption and asset choices crucially depend on the key preference parameters which we estimated in previous sections. We now document that the optimal choices of households depend crucially on how substitutable nondurable consumption and housing services are in the utility function. Recall that our period utility function was specified as
The elasticity of substitution between nondurable consumption and housing services is given by = Figure 23 shows that, while qualitatively, the life cycle pattern of consumption and housing response are similar to that in the benchmark case, households adjust their stock of housing more quickly to their optimal level with the lower unit elasticity of substitution. Intuitively, the lower the elasticity of substitution, the more costly it is to sustain a suboptimally low housing/nondurables ratio. The main difference between the less elastic Cobb Douglas case and the benchmark is that with a lower elasticity of substitution between nondurables and housing households adjust their housing stock towards the optimal level more quickly (but to about the same extent). 31 
Conclusion
In this paper we have constructed and estimated a partial equilibrium model of consumption and housing demand with a frictional housing market. Nonconvex adjustment costs and financing constraints make it optimal for a household to adjust the size of her house only infrequently.
For the benchmark parameterization households move three times in the first fifteen years of life, before reaching their optimal housing size. Negative income shocks slow down this accumulation process. On the other hand, if income declines or/and house price declines occur after the household has adjusted to its optimal (pre-shock) level these shocks affect consumption of nondurables, but do not lead to changes in housing stock.
At the center of this adjustment behavior is the ability of households to use home equity to smooth temporary shocks. Future research has to uncover whether introducing further frictions into the housing finance decision that make home equity lines of credit and reverse mortgages less attractive are able to overturn these results.
12 Computational Appendix
Recursive Formulation of the Problem
The model in recursive formulation can be written as 
Transformation of the State Space
One problem of the formulation of the problem above is that the constraint set for (a , h ) is not rectangular, and that the constraint on h depends on a , which is itself a choice variable.
This problem can be overcome by defining a new variable, voluntary equity, q , as Since we use an adjustment cost that is nonconvex, the household decision problem is not a convex programming problem and numerical approaches the require differentiability of the value function cannot be applied. Therefore we use discrete state space dynamic programming techniques to solve the problem. In particular, we discretize the state space for (q, h) into a finite rectangular grid (the income and house price process process is already a finite state
Markov chain by assumption) and maximize the objective function by searching, for each (q, h)
over the finite grid of admissible choices (q , h ). The consumption choice is implied by the budget constraint.
Given a terminal value function (given by the bequest function we can iterate backward in age of the household to solve for the age-dependent optimal policy (and value) functions. Once we have computed these, simulated life cycle patterns of consumption, housing and financial wealth can be generated for any sequence of house price and income shocks.
